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691 
GLOBAL CHILD WELFARE: 
THE CHALLENGES FOR FAMILY LAW 
ANN LAQUER ESTIN* 
Children in transnational families face the same kinds of crises that 
other children experience, compounded by issues of language, culture, 
nationality, and immigration status.  Although the global dimension of these 
families introduces additional concerns, courts and child welfare 
authorities have the same fundamental obligation to extend their protection 
to all children present in the United States.  This paper reviews a series of 
problems posed by child welfare cases with international dimensions, and 
considers how the Hague Child Protection Convention may be useful in 
these cases, arguing that implementation of the Convention should include 
significant attention to its cooperation provisions. 
 
Our child welfare systems make decisions with profound implications 
for children and their families, against a background of chronic shortages of 
resources, a complex legal, political and bureaucratic environment, and 
urgent needs across many sectors of local communities.1  In these cases, 
agencies and courts seek to determine and foster the best interests of 
children, while at the same time carrying out their responsibility to make 
reasonable efforts to preserve families and respect the rights and interests of 
parents.  Child welfare cases with international issues are even more 
complex, adding problems of citizenship and immigration status into the 
mix, along with issues of language and culture and the need for casework 
and litigation techniques that can reach across national borders.2 
The additional complexity of transnational family law cases increases the 
risk that the process will skew against children=s interest in family 
preservation and their parents= right to make decisions concerning the 
upbringing of their children.  In the United States, these interests have 
significant constitutional weight, elaborated in case law that extends both 
                                                                                                                 
*  Aliber Family Chair in Law, University of Iowa.  My thanks to Kathleen Cerniglia and 
Abigail Linn for excellent research assistance. 
1. Although the specifics of these systems vary significantly from state to state, federal 
legislation shapes child welfare policy and federal funding supports state child protection 
programs.  See generally Ann Laquer Estin, Sharing Governance: Family Law in Congress 
and the States, 18 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL=Y 267, 286-90 (2009). 
2.  See generally ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., UNDERCOUNTED, UNDERSERVED: IMMIGRANT 
AND REFUGEE FAMILIES AND THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM (2006); International Issues in 
Dependency Court Cases, Judges’ Page Newsl. (Nat’l Council of Juvenile and Family Court 
Judges & CASA for Children) Feb. 2008. 
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substantive and procedural protection to the parent-child relationship under 
the Due Process Clause.  As a constitutional matter, parents have the right 
to notice and an opportunity for a hearing when a state intervenes in a 
parent-child relationship, and their interests are protected by a heightened 
standard of proof in cases involving a termination of parental rights.3  The 
protection of these constitutional guarantees extends to all persons involved 
in state court proceedings, whatever their nationality or immigration status.4  
Although implementing these protections may be more difficult in 
international child welfare cases, courts and case workers have an 
obligation to make extra efforts to assure the basic fairness of these 
proceedings in cases with international dimensions. 
At the international level, human rights law extends broad protection to 
family relationships through treaties, including the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child5 and the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights.6  In addition, the four Hague Children=s 
Conventions include procedures for cross-border cooperation in individual 
cases, particularly those involving international child abduction or 
intercountry adoption.7  The United States is currently working toward 
ratification of the 1996 Hague Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, 
Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in Respect of Parental 
                                                                                                                 
3.  Note that there is no constitutional requirement for appointment of counsel in cases 
involving termination of parental rights of indigent parents.  Lassiter v. Dep=t of Social 
Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981).  But see M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996) (holding that 
indigent parent has right to appeal parental rights termination without paying costs for 
preparing a transcript). 
4.  See Interest of Mainor T., 674 N.W.2d 442 (Neb. 2004).  In Mathews v. Diaz, 426 
U.S.67 (1976), the Supreme Court wrote: “There are literally millions of aliens within the 
jurisdiction of the United States.  The Fifth Amendment, as well as the Fourteenth 
Amendment, protects every one of these persons from deprivation of life, liberty, or property 
without due process of law.  Even one whose presence in this country is unlawful, 
involuntary, or transitory is entitled to that constitutional protection.”  Id. (citations omitted); 
see also Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, part II (1981) (holding that undocumented aliens are 
also protected by the Equal Protection Clause). 
5.  Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25 (Annex), U.N. GAOR, 44th 
Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/49, at 166 (Nov. 20, 1989), reprinted at 28 I.L.M. 
1456 (1989) (signed but not ratified by the United States) [hereinafter CRC]. 
6.  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. 
No. 95-20, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (ratified by the United States in 1992) 
[hereinafter ICCPR]. 
7.  See generally Ann Laquer Estin, Families Across Borders: The Hague Children=s 
Conventions and the Case for International Family Law in the United States, 62 FLA. L. 
REV. 47 (2010); see also Linda J. Silberman, Co-Operative Efforts in Private International 
Law on Behalf of Children: The Hague Children=s Conventions, 323 RECUEIL DES COURS 
(COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACAD. OF INT=L L.) 261, 329-89 (2006). 
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Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children.8   Once ratified, 
this will provide important new channels for communication and 
cooperation between child protection authorities in the United States and 
other Convention countries.  
Part I of this paper surveys the current landscape of international child 
welfare proceedings in the United States, noting six types of recurring 
problems.  These include the grounds for asserting jurisdiction over 
children; protection for procedural rights of parents who are beyond the 
court=s jurisdiction; consular notice under the Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations; the role of factors such as culture, language, and 
immigration status in working with parents and children; procedures for 
cross-border placements; and children=s access to special forms of relief 
under federal immigration laws.  Part II considers the Child Protection 
Convention, noting ways it might be useful in these cases and concluding 
that implementation in the United States should include significant efforts 
to assist the states in improving global cooperation in child welfare cases. 
I. Transnational Child Protection Cases 
Agencies and courts working with global families caught up in the child 
welfare system work with the same constitutional requirements, federal 
statutes, and state law that apply to purely domestic cases.  Nearly all states 
have enacted the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act 
(or its predecessor, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act), which 
addresses interstate and international proceedings.9  In addition, cross-
border cases raise questions under international treaties, including the 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations10 and the Hague Conventions on 
service of process and taking evidence.  Federal immigration law 
                                                                                                                 
8.  Hague Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and 
Co-operation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of 
Children, Oct. 19, 1996, 2204 U.N.T.S. 39130, reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 1391 (1996) 
[hereinafter Child Protection Convention].  The United States signed the Child Protection 
Convention in October 2010; see infra part II.   
9.  Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act ' 102(4), 9 U.L.A. (Part 
1A) 662 (1999) [hereinafter UCCJEA].  Massachusetts is the only exception.  Note, 
however, that some states have enacted non-uniform versions of the UCCJEA.  The District 
of Columbia and the U.S. Virgin Islands have also adopted the UCCJEA.  For more 
information, see the web site of the Uniform Law Commission at www.nccusl.org.  
10.  Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, opened for signature Apr. 24, 1963, 596 
U.N.T.S. 261 (entered into force Mar. 19, 1967) [hereinafter VCCR]. 
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significantly complicates child welfare cases, but it does not generally 
preempt state jurisdiction.11 
A. Jurisdiction 
Courts in the United States take jurisdiction in child welfare cases under 
the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), 
which applies to any proceeding in which legal custody, physical custody, 
or visitation with respect to a child is an issue.12  Section 105(a) directs 
courts to treat a foreign county as if it were a state of the United States for 
purposes of determining jurisdiction.13  In addition, section 105(b) provides 
for recognition and enforcement of any child-custody determination made 
in a foreign county under factual circumstances that are consistent with the 
jurisdictional standards of the statute.14 
Under the UCCJEA, a state court typically does not have jurisdiction to 
make a custody determination with respect to a child who has been in the 
United States for less than six months.  The statute accords a jurisdictional 
priority to the child=s “home state,” defined as the state “in which a child 
lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least six consecutive 
months immediately before commencement of a child-custody 
proceeding.”15    Under section 105(a), the child=s home state may be a 
                                                                                                                 
11.  See, e.g., Interest of Angelica L., 767 N.W.2d 74 (Neb. 2009).  This is not true with 
respect to undocumented immigrant children apprehended by federal immigration 
authorities; see infra notes 131 and accompanying text. 
12.  UCCJEA, supra note 9, at  ' 102(4), 9 U.L.A. (Part 1A) 662 (1999).  In addition to 
cases of divorce or separation, this includes proceedings for neglect, abuse, dependency, 
guardianship, paternity, termination of parental rights, and protection from domestic 
violence. 
13.  UCCJEA ' 105(a).   
14.  UCCJEA ' 105(b).  Note, however, that a court need not apply the UCCJEA in this 
respect “if the child custody law of a foreign country violates fundamental principles of 
human rights.”  UCCJEA ' 105(c). 
15.  UCCJEA ' 102(7).  For a child less than six months of age, the home state is the 
state “in which the child lived from birth with any of the persons mentioned.”  The definition 
also provides that Aa period of temporary absence” from the state of any of the persons 
mentioned is counted as part of the jurisdictional period.  The phrase “person acting as a 
parent” is defined in ' 102(13). 
Specifically, a state court has jurisdiction to make an initial child-custody determination 
if the state “is the home State of the child on the date of the commencement of the 
proceeding, or was the home State of the child within six months before the commencement 
of the proceeding and the child is absent from this State but a parent or a person acting as a 
parent continues to live in this State.”   See UCCJEA ' 201(a)(1).  If this test is met, it is not 
necessary for the child or the parents to be physically present in the state when the 
proceeding is commenced, see In re Claudia S., 31 Cal. Rptr. 3d 697 (Ct. App 2005), but the 
parents must be afforded notice and an opportunity for a hearing, as described below. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol63/iss4/5
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foreign country.  When a child has been living in a state for at least six 
months, a court may take jurisdiction based on the child=s residence, 
without regard to the nationality or immigration status of the child or his or 
her parents.16 
If no court in the United States or a foreign country can assert “home 
state” jurisdiction, or if a court in the home state has declined to exercise 
jurisdiction, a court in another state may assume jurisdiction provided that 
two additional requirements are met.  The child and at least one parent (or 
“person acting as a parent”) must have a significant connection to the state 
other than mere physical presence, and there must be substantial evidence 
available in the state concerning “the child=s care, protection, training, and 
personal relationships.”17 Under the UCCJEA, even if a child has a home 
state in another state or foreign country, a state court may exercise 
temporary emergency jurisdiction if the child is present in the state and “the 
child has been abandoned or it is necessary in an emergency to protect the 
child because the child, or a sibling or parent of the child, is subjected to or 
threatened with mistreatment or abuse.”18  Thus, if a parent dies or 
disappears or abuses a child shortly after arriving in a state with a child, the 
state court will be permitted to exercise temporary emergency jurisdiction, 
at least until the child=s other parent is located and arrangements for the 
child=s safe transfer can be made.19  The same basis for jurisdiction could be 
applied to an unaccompanied, undocumented immigrant minor found in the 
United States.20 
If the court hearing an emergency matter is informed of a custody 
proceeding or determination in another state or foreign country, the 
                                                                                                                 
16.  Cf. Angelica L., 767 N.W.2d at 89; Arteaga v. Texas Dep=t of Protective & 
Regulatory Servs., 924 S.W.2d 756, 760 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996); In re Stephanie M., 867 P.2d 
706, 713-717 (Cal. 1994). 
State courts do not have jurisdiction to determine custody of a child living in another 
state or a foreign country, unless the requirements for temporary emergency jurisdiction are 
met.  See, e.g., Baby Boy M., 46 Cal. Rptr. 3d 196 (Ct. App. 2006) (no jurisdiction under the 
UCCJEA where agency could not located child who had allegedly been taken to another 
state by his biological father).  Cf. Matter of Stanley R., 542 N.Y.S.2d 734 (App. Div. 1989), 
decided prior to the enactment of the UCCJEA, which found subject matter jurisdiction 
when the child=s parents lived in the state but the child was living in El Salvador. 
17.  UCCJEA ' 201(a)(2). 
18.  UCCJEA ' 204(a).  If there is no previous child-custody determination entitled to 
enforcement under the UCCJEA, a determination made under this section can become a final 
determination, “if it so provides and this State becomes the home State of the child.” 
19.  State subject matter jurisdiction may be preempted if the child entered the country 
illegally and is the subject of deportation proceedings.  See infra note 131 and accompanying 
text.  
20.  E.g., In re Jorge G., 78 Cal. Rptr. 3d 552, 558 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008). 
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UCCJEA provides that the court “shall immediately communicate” with the 
other court.21  This was an issue in In re Nada R., after a state court 
exercised emergency jurisdiction over children who were residents of Saudi 
Arabia, based on an incident of physical abuse in the United States.22  The 
father argued that the juvenile court in California was required to 
communicate with the court that had granted him custody in Saudi Arabia, 
and the appellate court remanded for a determination of whether the 
juvenile court could assert continuing jurisdiction.23  A child custody 
determination made on this emergency basis may become a final 
determination, and the state in which it is made may become the child=s 
home state, if no proceeding is commenced in a state or foreign country 
with a basis for jurisdiction consistent with the grounds under the 
UCCJEA.24 
Another example, In re A.C., involved a dependency petition filed with 
respect to a Mexican child who had been hospitalized in California as a 
result of serious injuries received in an automobile accident.25  The parents 
lived in Mexico and were unable to care for the child at the time of her 
discharge because the mother had also suffered serious injuries.  
Concluding that Mexico was the child=s home state, the court held that 
California did not have a basis to exercise subject matter jurisdiction under 
the UCCJEA.  In the circumstances, the court also found that there was no 
basis for temporary emergency jurisdiction, since the parents had not 
abandoned the child or subjected her to mistreatment or abuse.26 
Parents who do not reside in the state where child welfare proceedings 
are pending sometimes argue that the court should not proceed without 
obtaining personal jurisdiction over the parents.  State courts have 
                                                                                                                 
21.  UCCJEA ' 204(d). 
22.  In re Nada R., 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 493 (Ct. App. 2001).  After the abuse occurred in 
Florida, the mother brought the children to her home in California, and the juvenile court 
proceeding occurred there.  The state also presented significant evidence that the father had 
failed to protect the older child from sexual abuse in Saudi Arabia. 
23.  The mother argued that the custody determination made in Saudi Arabia would not 
be enforceable in the United States because she was not given notice and an opportunity for 
a hearing, and therefore that the court in California should not be required to communicate 
with the court in Saudi Arabia.  This issue was also remanded to the juvenile court.   
24.  UCCJEA ' 204(d). 
25.  In re A.C., 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 431 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005). 
26.  Id.  In the face of evidence that the authorities in Mexico would have deferred to the 
agency in California, because there was no specialized pediatric facility available in the 
parents= home town of Tiajuana, the court concluded that: “A child who is a foreign national 
cannot be made the subject of California juvenile dependency law simply because California 
offers better medical care than the child=s home state.” 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol63/iss4/5
2011] GLOBAL CHILD WELFARE 697 
 
 
concluded that these cases fall within the “status exception” to the personal 
jurisdiction requirement,27 concluding that constitutional due process norms 
are adequately addressed when nonresident parents are given notice and an 
opportunity to participate in the court=s proceedings.28  State statutes may 
provide expressly for jurisdiction over nonresident parents in juvenile 
cases,29 and in some circumstances personal jurisdiction might be asserted 
under a long arm statute applying a “minimum contacts” theory of personal 
jurisdiction. Not every case is appropriate for this approach, however.  In 
Interest of John Doe, the Hawaii Supreme Court concluded that it was 
unreasonable and unfair on the facts of that case for the state courts to 
terminate the parental rights of a mother living in the Philippines, whose 
only contact with the state of Hawaii was to acquiesce in the father=s 
request to bring the child to the state for a brief visit.30 
In an action to terminate parental rights based on the child=s presence 
within the state, especially when the child=s parents are not subject to the 
court=s personal jurisdiction, a court should consider carefully the extent of 
the contacts between the child and the state and the possibility that another 
forum may be more appropriate.  The UCCJEA permits a court to decline 
jurisdiction in this situation based on the motion of any party, the court=s 
own motion, or the request of another court.31 
Looking forward, many aspects of the UCCJEA can be harmonized with 
the Hague Child Protection Convention, but there are also points of 
difference. As the United States proceeds toward ratification, amendments 
to the UCCJEA will be needed to assure proper respect for the jurisdiction 
of foreign courts.  To assure that their orders are recognized and enforced 
abroad, state courts will also need to follow the Convention rules in 
international cases.   
                                                                                                                 
27.  See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734-45 (1877); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 
208 n. 30 (1977). 
28.  E.g., Utah ex rel. W.A. (D.A. v. Utah), 63 P.3d 607, 613-17 (Utah 2002) (citing 
cases); see also In re Claudia S., 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 697, 703-04 (2005); J.D. v. Tuscaloosa 
Dep=t of Human Resources, 923 So.2d 303 (Alab. Ct. Civ. App. 2005) (adopting analysis of 
Utah ex rel. W.A.); Tammie J.C. v. Robert T.R., 663 N.W.2d 734, 741 (Wis. 2003). 
29.  E.g., UTAH CODE ANN. ' 78-3a-110(13) (cited in Utah ex rel. W.A., 63 P.3d at 611-
13); Wis. Stat. ' 822.12 (cited in Tammie J.C., 663 N.W.2d at 744-45.  
30.  Interest of John Doe, 926 P.2d 1290, 1300 (Haw. 1996). The case was decided 
before adoption of the UCCJEA, under a statute that allowed the courts to take jurisdiction 
in child protection proceedings concerning any child “found within the State.”  
31.  UCCJEA ' 207.  Similar questions were addressed in international cases under the 
statute that preceded the UCCJEA.  See Arteaga v. Texas Dep=t of Protective & Regulatory 
Servs., 924 S.W.2d 756 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996) (describing the family=s strong connections to 
Texas and the United States); see also In re Stephanie M., 867 P.2d 706, 714-15 (Cal. 1994). 
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B. Procedural Protections 
As a constitutional matter, all parents have a right to notice and an 
opportunity for a hearing before children are removed from their care.32  
While this may be deferred in emergency situations, or when the child is 
removed for a brief period for investigation, the hearing must follow as 
soon as possible.33  In addition, the Supreme Court has ruled that 
termination of parental rights must be based on proof of unfitness by clear 
and convincing evidence.34  An important basis for this requirement is the 
risk of an erroneous decision, since termination involves “imprecise 
subjective standards that leave determinations unusually open to the 
subjective values of the judge.” Moreover, “[b]ecause parents subject to 
termination proceedings are often poor, uneducated, or members of 
minority groups, such proceedings are often vulnerable to judgments based 
on cultural or class bias.”35 In some states, statutes require the appointment 
of counsel for an indigent parent facing termination of parental rights,36 but 
this is not required as a matter of federal constitutional law.37 
These baseline procedural rights pose particular challenges in cases 
involving parents who do not reside in the United States.  If a parent=s 
whereabouts are unknown, due process requires that authorities make 
reasonable efforts to locate the parent.38  Assistance may be obtained from 
the appropriate consulate39 or organizations such as International Social 
                                                                                                                 
32.  Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
33.  Nicholson v. Scopetta, 344 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2003).  Cf. Tenenbaum v. Willi 
ams, 193 F.3d 581 (2d Cir. 1999). 
34.  Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (applying the Due Process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment).  At the adjudication stage, courts may determine that a child is 
dependent based on proof by a preponderance of the evidence. 
35.  Id. at 762-63. 
36.  E.g., Cal. Fam. Code ' 7862; N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act ' 262.  
37.  Lassiter v. Dep=t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981).  An indigent parent is entitled to 
appeal an order terminating parental rights even if the parent cannot afford to pay fees for 
preparation of a transcript.  See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996).  Under federal law, 
states are directed to provide a guardian ad litem to represent children=s interests in abuse 
and neglect cases, but not all states comply.  See 42 U.S.C. ' 5106a (b) (2) (A) (xiii); see 
generally Gerard F. Glynn, The Child=s Representation Under CAPTA: It is Time for 
Enforcement, 6 NEV. L.J. 1250 (2006). 
38.  See In re Claudia S., 31 Cal. Rptr. 3d 697, 704 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005).  In this unusual 
case, the juvenile court in California took jurisdiction and conducted hearings for a year in a 
case filed after mother and children had moved to Mexico; the appellate court described this 
as “a continuing charade played out for the benefit of no one” and remanded for new 
jurisdiction hearing.  Id. 
39.  See infra part I.C. 
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Service (ISS), which has a branch in the United States.40  Once parents are 
located, it may be necessary to use international litigation tools such as the 
Hague Convention on Service of Process.41  A parent may not have the 
resources or the visa necessary to travel to make an appearance before the 
court, and even if the parent is present there may be significant cultural or 
language barriers that complicate the hearing process. 
The Child Protection Convention also protects procedural rights of 
parents and children. In cases that fall within the Convention, another 
Convention country may refuse to recognize a U.S. court order terminating 
an individual’s parental rights under Article 23(2)(c) “if the order was 
entered without the individual being given the opportunity to be heard.”  
Similarly, under Article 23(2)(b), recognition may be refused of any order 
entered, except in urgent situations, without the child having been provided 
the opportunity to be heard.   
1. Hague Litigation Conventions 
As with any other international civil litigation, service of process in child 
welfare proceedings must conform to the Hague Service Convention if it is 
made in any of the more than 60 countries which are Contracting States.  
Service in participating countries that does not comply with the treaty is 
ineffective, even if the respondent had actual notice.42 These principles are 
discussed in a series of California child welfare cases, which affirm that the 
initial service on a parent in another Convention country must meet the 
requirements of state law as well as the treaty.43 Once notice of the 
proceeding is made and jurisdiction established, subsequent 
communications may be transmitted less formally.44  
Most foreign countries do not have the kinds of pretrial discovery 
practices used in the United States, and lawyers must be extremely cautious 
before attempting to collect evidence abroad.  Parties may initiate a request 
                                                                                                                 
40.  Information is available on their web site at www.iss-usa.org. 
41.  Hague Convention of 15 November 1965 on the Service Abroad of Judicial and 
Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. 6638, 658 
U.N.T.S. 163, reprinted in 4 I.L.M. 341 (1965) (hereinafter Service Convention). 
 See also Hague Convention of 18 March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in 
Civil and Commercial Matters, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. 7444, 847 U.N.T.S. 231, appended 
to 28 U.S.C. ' 1781, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 37 (1969) (hereinafter Evidence Convention). 
42.  E.g., In re Alyssa F., 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). 
43.  See id.; see also In re Jorge G., 78 Cal. Rptr. 3d 552 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).  Defective 
service may be waived if the parent makes a general appearance.  See In re Vanessa Q., 114 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 294 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010). 
44.  See In re Jennifer O., 108 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (applying 
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694 (1988)). 
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for letters rogatory, requesting the cooperation of a foreign judge, or may 
utilize the more streamlined procedures available in more than 50 countries 
under the Hague Evidence Convention.  In child welfare cases, these 
procedures may assist a court in obtaining genetic evidence to determine a 
child=s parentage.45 
2. Hearings 
Despite the constitutional stature of the right to a hearing in proceedings 
concerning parental rights, parents who are incarcerated or have been 
removed from the United States may be unable to appear.  Courts have a 
responsibility to assure that these parents have the opportunity to 
participate.  For example, Interest of Mainor T. involved a mother who was 
arrested and then deported to Guatemala without her children after they 
were taken into custody.46  She was not present for any proceedings in the 
case, including an initial hearing held while she was incarcerated in a jail 
next door to the courthouse.  The Nebraska Supreme Court eventually 
reversed the lower court=s termination of her parental rights, emphasizing 
that the courts have a “responsibility to ensure that proceedings which lead 
to the termination of a familial relationship are fundamentally fair.”47 
When it is not possible for a parent to be present, courts have arranged 
for participation by alternative means, such as a telephone conference call 
or video conferencing.48  In Termination of Parental Rights to Adrianna 
A.E. the Wisconsin Court of Appeals noted arrangements made to allow a 
father to appear by a two-way webcam, with an additional connection that 
allowed the father to communicate privately with his lawyer by instant 
messages.49  The court concluded that these measures had extended the 
father an opportunity for meaningful participation in the hearing and 
                                                                                                                 
45.  Courts in the United States also handle incoming requests for the same kinds of 
evidence; see, e.g., In re Letter Rogatory from the Nedenes District Court, Norway, 216 
F.R.D. 277 (S.D. N.Y. 2003). 
46.  Interest of Mainor T., 674 N.W.2d 442 (Neb. 2004).  In this case, the only abuse 
alleged was that the mother had slapped the older child. 
47.  Id.; see also Interest of Angelica L., 767 N.W.2d 74 (Neb. 2009), in which a mother 
was present for an initial hearing before being deported to Guatemala.  Although unable to 
attend the adjudicatory and dispositional hearings, she was eventually able to obtain a visa 
and returned to participate in termination hearings, more than two and a half years after her 
children were taken into custody.  The court reversed an order terminating her parental 
rights, concluding that there was not clear and convincing evidence of her unfitness. 
48.  E.g., Interest of M.G.F., 476 S.E.2d 100 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (participation by 
conference call).  
49.  Termination of Parental Rights to Adrianna A.E., 745 N.W.2d 701 (Wisc. Ct. App. 
2007). 
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effective assistance of counsel.  Although the right to participate may be 
waived, courts have a responsibility to inquire whether efforts have been 
made to facilitate the appearance of an absent parent.50  In some cases, a 
continuance may be appropriate, particularly when parents have been 
making good faith efforts to remain in contact with their children and the 
court.51 
C. Consular Notification under the Vienna Convention 
Provided the jurisdictional principles of the UCCJEA are followed, it 
does not matter whether the children or parents involved in a child 
protection proceeding are U.S. or foreign nationals.52  When the individuals 
involved are not U.S. citizens, however, courts and agencies have additional 
responsibilities under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 
(“VCCR”).53  To comply with the VCCR, local authorities must notify the 
appropriate consulate whenever a guardian or trustee is appointed for a 
minor or incapacitated person who is a foreign citizen,54  and must inform a 
foreign citizen who is arrested, imprisoned, or detained of his or her right to 
consular notice and access.55  Consular officials may also provide other 
assistance to foreign nationals present in the United States in matters 
pending before courts or other authorities.56  Consular officials of the 
                                                                                                                 
50.  E.g., New Mexico ex rel. Steven, 992 P.2d 317 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999).  
51.  Cf. M.G.F., 476 S.E.2d at 100 (upholding refusal to grant continuance after mother 
was deported to Germany). 
52.  See, e.g., Interest of J.H., 536 S.E.2d 805 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000). 
53.  VCCR, supra note 10.  Note that additional bilateral agreements exist with some 
countries.  Practical information for state and local authorities in the United States in 
included in U.S. Dep=t of State, Consular Notification and Access (3d ed. 2010), available at 
http://travel.state.gov/pdf/cna/CNA_Manual_3d_Edition.pdf.  See generally LUKE T. LEE & 
JOHN QUIGLEY, CONSULAR LAW AND PRACTICE (3d ed. 2008). 
54.  VCCR, supra note 10, art. 37.  See also id., art. 5(h), which defines “consular 
functions” to include “safeguarding, within the limits imposed by the laws and regulations of 
the receiving State, the interests of minors and other persons lacking full capacity who are 
nationals of the sending State, particularly where any guardianship or trusteeship is required 
with respect to such person.” 
55.  Id., art. 36(1).  In some bilateral consular conventions, notice that a foreign citizen 
has been arrested or detained is mandatory.  After being notified, consular officials have 
rights to visit, converse and correspond with an individual in prison, custody or detention.  
See id.  The implementation of these rights in the United States was addressed in Medellín v. 
Texas, 522 U.S. 491 (2008), which held that the VCCR is not self-executing. 
56.  VCCR, supra note 10, art. 5(I) defines consular functions to include:  
[S]ubject to the practices and procedures obtaining in the receiving State, representing or 
arranging appropriate representation for nationals of the sending State before tribunals and 
other authorities of the receiving State, of the purpose of obtaining, in accordance with the 
laws and regulations of the receiving State, provisional measures for the preservation of the 
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United States have the same rights to notice and communication with U.S. 
nationals who may be caught up in foreign child protection, guardianship, 
or criminal proceedings.57 
State courts have concluded that failure to give notice under the VCCR 
does not deprive the court of jurisdiction in child protection cases.58  These  
courts focus on language in the Convention providing that consular aid 
must be conducted “within the limits imposed by the laws and regulations” 
of the forum state,59 or providing that notice shall be “without prejudice to 
the operation of the laws and regulations” of the forum state.60   Borrowing 
from the principles applied in criminal cases, some courts hold that a parent 
must be able to show that he or she was prejudiced by the lack of consular 
notification.61  Other cases have concluded that notice was sufficient when 
the consulate obtained knowledge of proceedings concerning a child, even 
if the notice did not come from the state.62   In Arteaga v. Texas 
Department of Protective and Regulatory Services, the court described the 
state=s actions as constituting “the bare minimum of acceptable notice to the 
Mexican consulate,” and urged agency caseworkers to provide a clear 
record demonstrating that the consulate “received adequate notice affording 
it the opportunity for intervention if desired.”63 Another court pointed out 
that the lack of compliance with the VCCR by federal and state agencies is 
often the result of ignorance, and noted assurances by the local social 
                                                                                                                 
rights and interests of these nationals, where, because of absence or other reason, such 
nationals are unable at the proper time to assume the defence of their rights and interests. 
Id. 
57.  See U.S. Dep=t of State, Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) vol. 7, Consular Protection 
of U.S. Nationals Abroad.  The sections on children=s issues include: Child Abuse or 
Neglect, 7 FAM 1720, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/86820.pdf; 
Child Exploitation, 7 FAM 1730, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organi 
zation/86821.pdf; Forced Marriage of Minors, 7 FAM 1740, available at http://www.state. 
gov/documents/organization/86822.pdf; and Runaways, Abandoned Children and Other 
Unaccompanied Minors, 7 FAM 1760, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organi 
zation/86824.pdf. 
58.  E.g., In re Stephanie M, 867 P.2d 706, 712-13 (Cal. 1994).  Stephanie M. also held 
that the failure to notify the Mexican consulate was not a violation of the parents= due 
process rights.  Id. at 717; see also In re Angelica L., 767 N.W.2d 74 (Neb. 2009); Arteaga 
v. Texas Dep=t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 924 S.W.2d 756, 761 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1996) (holding that state adequately complied with VCCR). 
59.  Stephanie M., 867 P.2d at 712 (quoting VCCR, supra note 10, art. 5(h)). 
60.  Id. (quoting VCCR, supra note 10, art. 5(I)). 
61.  E.g., Interest of Antonio O., 784 N.W.2d 457, 466-67 (Neb. Ct. App. 2010); E.R. v. 
Marion Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 729 N.E.2d 1052, 1057-59 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). 
62.  E.g. E.R., 729 N.E.2d at 1056-59; Interest of L.A.M., 996 P.2d 839 (Kan. 2000). 
63.  Arteaga, 924 S.W.2d at 761 n.6. 
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services agency that they were developing a protocol to assure compliance 
in the future.64  
Some state or local social services agencies have entered into a 
Memorandum of Understanding with a foreign consulate in the United 
States to spell out consular notice procedures. This has been particularly 
common for cases involving children with Mexican citizenship.65  Social 
services agencies should build consular notification into their procedures 
and assure that caseworkers have the training and resources needed to 
follow thorough in these cases.66   Statutes in Nebraska articulate a series of 
requirements for child protection cases involving a foreign national minor 
or a minor having multiple nationalities, including providing certain written 
information to the minor and his or her parents, in English and the minor=s  
native language, and  providing notice to the appropriate consulate within 
ten working days.67   
Although there is no direct interface between the consular notice 
requirements of the VCCR and the cooperation  provisions of the Hague 
Child Protection Convention, countries may find it useful to coordinate the 
consular and Central Authority functions in child welfare cases. Consular 
officials are likely to continue to play an important role as the local 
representatives of foreign countries working with children, parents and 
local authorities, particularly when no court proceedings have been 
commenced. 
                                                                                                                 
64.  E.R., 729 N.E.2d at 1059; see also Angelica L., 767 N.W.2d at 96-97 (Gerrard, J., 
concurring) (criticizing agency=s “cursory compliance with what was apparently regarded as 
a legal technicality” and noting that facts illustrate why “involvement of a foreign juvenile=s 
consulate should be regarded as important to promoting the juvenile=s best interests.”) 
65.  See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding on Consular Protection of Mexican 
Nationals between the county of Riverside Department of Public Social Services, California, 
and the Consulate of Mexico in San Bernardino, California, available at http://www.f2f. 
ca.gov/res/pdf/RiversideMOUMexicanConsulate.pdf. 
66.  See, e.g., Iowa Dep=t of Human Servs., Employees= Manual Title 17 Chapter C(1):  
Child Welfare--Case Planning Procedures 38-39 (rev. June 25, 2010), available at 
http://www.dhs.state.ia.us/policyanalysis/PolicyManualPages/Manual_Documents/Master/1
7-C1.pdf.  The Iowa Manual includes links to the DHS policy statement on case planning for 
children with Mexican citizenship, the state=s Memorandum of Understanding with Mexico, 
and a consular notification form with instructions.  Case workers are also instructed to 
provide written information to the child and the child=s parents or custodian in both English 
and Spanish to explain the juvenile court process and their rights in juvenile court, with a 
link to a brochure that can be used for this purpose.   
67.  Neb. Rev. Stat. ' 43-3804(2) (discussed in Angelica L., 767 N.W.2d 74). 
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D. Transnational Family Interventions 
Navigating child welfare cases within a diverse and heterogeneous 
population requires a high level of “cultural competence” from courts and 
agencies.68  As noted by Lori Klein, “[f]rom the outset of a child 
dependency case, the social worker assigned to the case makes highly 
subjective decisions about whether and to what degree the parent poses a 
risk to her child, and about whether and to what degree the parent would 
benefit from reunification services.”69 Beyond the general questions of 
cultural or religious difference, courts and agencies also need to understand 
how issues of immigration status may affect family relationships, and how 
state intervention may further complicate an immigrant family=s already-
precarious situation.70  
1. Defining Neglect, Abuse and Abandonment 
State agencies have a responsibility to respond when they learn of 
children who may be abused, neglected, or abandoned.  After investigation, 
if an agency seeks a judicial determination that a child is “dependent and 
neglected,” or “in need of assistance,” its next step is to work with the 
family to remedy the problems that led to the abuse or neglect.  Federal 
legislation frames the state=s obligation in terms of making “reasonable 
efforts” to preserve and reunify families.71 This obligation exists in all 
                                                                                                                 
68.  See Lori Klein, Doing What=s Right: Providing Culturally Competent Reunification 
Services, 12 BERKELEY WOMEN=S L.J. 20, 21 (1997).  See also Note, Do “Reasonable 
Efforts” Require Cultural Competence?  The Importance of Culturally Competent 
Reunification Services in the California Child Welfare System, 5 HASTING RACE & POV. L.J. 
397 (2008) (reviewing reunification efforts made in cases with elements of cultural 
diversity). 
69.  Klein, supra note 68, at 31.  In Dependency of A.A., 20 P.3d 492 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2001), a case involving domestic violence, sexual abuse, and alcohol abuse, the courts 
rejected the father=s argument that the court should consider his Roma culture, saying “No 
matter what country or culture a family comes from, returning children to such an 
environment would clearly not be in their best interests.” 
70.  See Kerry Abrams, Immigration Status and the Best Interests of the Child Standard, 
14 VA. J. SOC. POL=Y & L. 87, 92-94 (2006) (noting as a problem the family courts= lack of 
expertise in federal immigration law).  For an illustration of the cascade of problems that 
may follow a child welfare intervention, see In re Mainor T., 674 N.W.2d 442 (Neb. 2004), 
discussed in David B. Thronson, Creating Crisis: Immigration Raids and the Destabilization 
of Immigrant Families, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 391 (2008).  See generally Casey Found., 
supra note 2. 
71.  42 U.S.C. ' 671(a)(15)(B) (2010).  In making these efforts, however, the child=s 
health and safety remain “the paramount concern.”  42 U.S.C. ' 671 (a)(15)(A) (2010).  
These requirements were elaborated in the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 
1980 and the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997.  For a description of the process in 
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cases, unless a court determines that parents have subjected a child to 
“aggravated circumstances.”72  If the agency=s efforts to work with the 
family are not successful, the court and agency may proceed to terminate 
the parental rights of one or both parents.73  Given the high standard of 
proof required, however, a court may not terminate parental rights solely on 
the basis that allowing the child to remain in foster care, or in the United 
States, would be in the child=s best interests.74 
Despite the wide global consensus on the general principle of protecting 
the child=s welfare or best interests, more specific notions of what is 
appropriate or acceptable treatment of children diverge significantly.75  
Even within the United States, child rearing norms are strongly determined 
by culture, religion, or class.76  As a constitutional matter, law defines a 
zone within which parents have authority to make decisions without 
intervention from the state.  The borders of this protected zone have been 
defined primarily in law addressing educational and religious decisions, 
where parental autonomy is generally well-protected.77  There is no 
constitutional protection for practices that place a child=s physical well-
being in serious jeopardy, even if those practices are permitted or required 
within a parent=s cultural or religious community.  This is most notable in 
cases involving spiritual treatment as an alternative to conventional medical 
care,78 or practices such as female genital cutting.79  
                                                                                                                 
California, written before ASFA, see Klein, supra note 68, at 22-29. 
72.  42 U.S.C. ' 671(A)(15)(D). 
73.  To address the risk that children may spend long periods of time in foster care prior 
to reunification or termination, federal law also requires a permanency planning process to 
begin within a year after a child enters foster care.  42 U.S.C. ' 675(5)(c) (2010). 
74.  E.g., Interest of Angelica L., 767 N.W.2d 74 (Neb. 2009). See also Adoption of 
C.M.B.R., 332 S.W.3d 793, 810-12 (Mo. 2011) (reversing termination of parental rights 
after trial court failed to order investigation and social study to determine whether 
termination was in child’s best interests). See generally C. Elizabeth Hall, Where are My 
Children , , , and My Rights? Parental Rights Termination as a Consequence of Deportation, 
60 DUKE L.J. 1459 (2011). 
75.  See INT=L SOCIETY FOR PREVENTION OF CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT, WORLD 
PERSPECTIVES ON CHILD ABUSE (8th ed. 2008). 
76.  See generally ALISON DUNDES RENTELN, THE CULTURAL DEFENSE 48-72 (2004). 
77.  Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 
(1925), Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).  Cf. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 
158 (1944) (sustaining child labor law).  
78.  See also RENTELN, supra note 76, at 61-72 (recommending state intervention only 
when necessary to prevent irreparable harm to a child). 
79.  Cf. Adoption of Peggy, 767 N.E.2d 29 (Mass. 2002).  See also RENTELN, supra note 
76, at 51-53. Other issues, such as physical discipline, fall between these two ends of the 
spectrum.  See RENTELN, at 54-58. 
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Parents may place their children informally with relatives or friends or 
through an agency for some form of temporary care. This alone should not 
constitute abandonment or neglect under state child welfare statutes, 
provided that the parents continue to maintain contact with the child.80 
Defining child abandonment presents particular problems in global cases, 
where there are many reasons why a child may be present in the country 
without his or her parents.  A minor may be admitted on a nonimmigrant 
basis, for educational purposes or medical care,81 or as a refugee.82  A child 
may have entered illegally, or been the victim of trafficking.  The child may 
be a U.S. citizen, entitled to enter and remain in the United States even 
though his or her parents are not.83  The child may have been left alone in 
the United States after the death of a parent.84     
Appellate courts agree that a parent=s undocumented status is not a 
sufficient basis for termination of parental rights.85  Courts have also 
refused to rule that a child has been abandoned based solely on the fact that 
                                                                                                                 
80.  E.g., Adoption of A.M.H., 215 S.W.3d 793 (Tenn. 2007); Matter of Sanjivini K., 391 
N.E.2d 1316 (N.Y. 1979). The parents in A.M.H. spent years trying to regain custody of their 
daughter in a case that drew significant public attention; see, e.g., Andrew Jacobs, Chinese 
and American Cultures Clash in Custody Battle for Girl, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2004, at 5. Cf. 
Adoption of C.M.B.R., 332 S.W.3d 793, 813-18 (Mo. 2011) (finding sufficient evidence of 
abandonment). 
81.  E.g., In re A.C., 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 431, 433 (Ct. App. 2005) (child transferred from 
hospital in Mexico to California for specialized medical care). 
82.  See infra note 133 and accompanying text; see also Nahid H. v. Superior Court, 62 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 281, 284-85 (Ct. App. 1997) (mother sent children to United States to escape 
Iran-Iraq war). 
83.  Numerous cases suggest that an alien parent facing deportation is entitled to decide 
whether to leave with his or her minor U.S.-citizen child or allow the child to remain in the 
United States.  See In re B. & J., 756 N.W.2d 234, 240 n.5 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008). 
84.  Children may appear to be living alone when they avoid disclosing their parents= 
actual place of residence in an effort to avoid immigration consequences.  Involvement of 
consular representatives is particularly important in these cases. 
85.  See Marina P. v. Ariz. Dep=t of Econ. Sec., 152 P.3d 1209, 1216 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
2007); Interest of M.M., 587 S.E.2d 825, 832 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003).  As articulated by the 
court in Interest of M.M.:  
Essentially, the termination of the father=s parental rights was based on the 
possibility that the father could someday be deported and, . . . [the child] might 
be returned to DFACS=s custody or sent to Mexico. When we wield the 
awesome power entrusted to us in these cases, our decisions must be based on 
clear and convincing evidence of parental misconduct or inability and that 
termination is in the best interest of the child, and not speculation about >the 
vagaries or vicissitudes that beset every family on its journey through the 
thickets of life.=  
587 S.E.2d at 832. 
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the parent has been deported,86 or because the parent has left the country to 
obtain a visa,87 or because the parent failed to come forward when his or 
her child was taken into state custody.88  A parent=s immigration status may 
contribute toward circumstances that present an “imminent danger of abuse 
or neglect” for the child, however.89  In these cases, courts focus attention 
on parents= efforts to arrange appropriate care for their children, to maintain 
regular contact, and to provide financial support as far as they are able.90  If 
parents do not reside in the United States, the most appropriate course of 
action may be to arrange for children to return to their parents= care in the 
country where the parents are living,91 and courts have emphasized that the 
perceived advantages of living in the United States cannot be a basis for a 
termination of parental rights.92 
  
                                                                                                                 
86.  See, e.g., Interest of Angelica L., 767 N.W.2d 74, 94 (Neb. 2009); B & J, 756 
N.W.2d at 241 n.3; see also Ginger Thompson, After Losing Freedom, Some Immigrants 
Face Loss of Custody of Their Children, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2009, at A0.  In a particularly 
egregious case, federal authorities deported a U.S. citizen child with her father just hours 
after arresting him, despite knowledge that the child=s mother B also a U.S. citizen B claimed 
custody and was seeking an emergency family court order to confirm this.  See Castro v. 
U.S., 608 F.3d 266, 267-68 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam); Adam Liptak, Family Fight, Border 
Patrol Raid, Baby Deported, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2010, at A0. 
87.  See J.B. v. DeKalb Cnty. Dep=t of Human Res., 12 So. 3d 100, 112-14 (Ala. Civ. 
App. 2008). 
88.  Marina P., 152 P.3d at 1214-15; see also In re V.S., 548 S.E.2d 490, 494 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 2001) (reversing the termination  of parental rights that treated as abandonment a 
father=s failure to file a petition to establish parentage within 30 days of being notified of 
termination proceedings). 
89.  Marina P., 152 P.3d at 1216 n.9 (“That Mother is attempting to evade detection and 
deportation does not, in and of itself, create probable cause to believe her children are in 
imminent danger of abuse or neglect.  Again, while her illegal status may . . . contribute to 
such circumstances, in the absence of facts demonstrating that it does, it is not a sufficient 
basis on which CPS can take temporary custody.”); see also Interest of Aaron D., 691 
N.W.2d 164, 167 (Neb. 2005) (noting that the mother=s immigration status “is not relevant to 
our analysis of this appeal, except insofar as it has affected her ability to obtain 
transportation and employment”).  Cf. Rico v. Rodriguez, 120 P.3d 812, 816-17 (Nev. 2005) 
(considering a parent=s immigration status as a factor in the context of a custody dispute). 
90.  E.g., J.B., 12 So. 3d at 113-14; Angelica L., 767 N.W.2d at 94-95; Interest of Mainor 
T., 674 N.W.2d 442, 462-63 (Neb. 2004). 
91.  See  B. & J., 756 N.W.2d at 241-42; see also Angelica L., 767 N.W.2d at 93-94; In 
re Adoption of A.M.H., 215 S.W.3d 793, 813 (Tenn. 2007). 
92.  E.g., Angelica L., 767 N.W.2d at 93-94; In re Adoption of A.M.H., 215 S.W.3d at 
813. 
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2. Reasonable Efforts and Alternative Care 
State agencies have an obligation to provide parents with reasonable 
reunification services in all cases,93 but devising a treatment plan is often 
difficult in cases involving parents living in another country or 
undocumented immigrant parents in the United States.  Differences of 
language, culture and religion may complicate the process of assessing and 
working with these parents and children.94  Parents living in another 
country may not have access to the kinds of social services contemplated by 
the agency=s treatment plan.95  Immigration status issues may make it 
difficult to locate parents or other relatives, or render parents ineligible to 
participate in the services that are ordinarily available to help preserve and 
reunify families, such as food stamps, SSI, or TANF.96  Caseworkers may 
face pressure to cooperate with federal immigration authorities.97  If a 
parent is subject to removal, the case plan must take this into account in a 
reasonable way,98 particularly when circumstances change so that a parent 
finds it difficult or impossible to comply with the original plan.99   
State and federal laws provide that agencies should give special 
consideration to relatives in making foster care or adoptive placements, 
including an obligation to make diligent efforts to locate and evaluate any 
appropriate relatives.100  Parents may also request that their children be 
placed with particular family members or in a culturally appropriate foster 
home, but these provisions are not mandatory, and placement decisions are 
                                                                                                                 
93.  See, e.g., B & J, 756 N.W.2d at 241; Matter of Kittridge, 714 N.Y.S.2d 653 (Fam. 
Ct. 2000). 
94.  E.g., Edwards v. Cnty. of Arlington, 361 S.E.2d 644 (Va. Ct. App. 1987) . 
95.  E.g., B & J, 756 N.W.2d at 241; cf. M.V. v. Superior Court, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 864 (Ct. 
App. 2008) (noting that mother received services in Mexico after being deported). 
96.  See 8 U.S.C. ' 1611 (2010); Casey Found., supra note 2, at 16. 
97.  See, e.g., Marina P. v. Ariz. Dep=t of Econ. Sec., 152 P.3d 1209 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
2007); cf. Matter of A.C., 27 P.3d 960 (Mont. 2001) (parent arrested by immigration 
authorities after testimony in child protection proceeding). .  Note that states must have 
procedures in place to verify children=s citizenship and immigration status.  See 42 U.S.C. ' 
671(27) (2010). 
In an action described by the court as both “morally repugnant” and a violation of due 
process rights, a human services agency involved in one published case reported the parents 
to immigration authorities and then argued that they were unable to provide proper care for 
the children. See B & J, 756 N.W.2d at 241.  
98.  E.g., Interest of Mainor T., 674 N.W.2d 442 (Neb. 2004) (holding that case plan 
provided mother with no means of achieving permanency objective of reunification); In re 
Maria S., 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 655 (Ct. App. 2000) (finding that case plan was unreasonable 
where mother was subject to deportation). 
99.  E.g., Marina P., 152 P.3d at 1214-15, 1217. 
100.  See 42 U.S.C. ' 671(a)(19), (29) (2006); see, e.g., Cal. Fam. Code ' 7950 (2004). 
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ultimately controlled by the child=s best interests.101  Despite the priority 
given to placement of children with relatives, these placements are much 
more difficult to accomplish when extended family members live in another 
country.102    
Ideally, agency caseworkers in international cases work collaboratively 
with their counterparts in another country to investigate placements with 
grandparents or other family members, including obtaining a home study 
and determining if a local agency will be able to assume supervision of the 
placement.103  Consular representatives may facilitate or participate in 
cross-border placement efforts.104  In reality, the process does not work 
well, due to resource constraints and other complications.105 This is an area 
in which careful implementation of the cooperation provisions of the Hague 
Child Protection Convention might provide substantial assistance. In 2010, 
the United Nations approved Guidelines for the Alternative Care of 
Children, which were intended to help inform policy and practice under 
various international instruments “regarding the protection and well-being 
of children who are deprived of parental care or who are at risk of being 
so.”106 These Guidelines support the goal of keeping children in or 
returning them to the care of their family, and state that “[a]ll decisions 
concerning alternative care should take full account of the desirability, in 
principle, of maintaining the child as close as possible to his/her habitual 
place of residence, in order to facilitate contact and potential reintegration 
with his/her family and to minimize disruption of his/her educational, 
cultural and social life.”107 They include guidelines addressing the 
                                                                                                                 
101.  See, e.g., E.R. v. Marion Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 729 N.E.2d 1052, 1060-
61 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (rejecting the argument that failure to place children in Spanish-
speaking foster home, or with relatives in Mexico, was contrary to the children=s best 
interests); In re Dependency of A.A., 20 P.3d 492, 495 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (rejecting the 
argument that agency was required to pursue placement with grandparents); see also In re 
S.M., 938 S.W.2d 910, 921-23 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (finding that the benefits of placement 
of an orphaned refugee with relatives are outweighed by considerations of stability and 
established relationships). 
102.  A placement out of the country could foreclose the possibility of the child=s 
reunification with his or her parents. 
103.  See, e.g., In re Stephanie M., 867 P.2d 706, 711-12 (Cal. 1994). 
104.  See id. at 710-11. 
105.  See generally Casey Found., supra note 2, at 15-21.  Under federal law, there is no 
funding under the Title IV-E foster care program for cases involving undocumented 
immigrant children, unless they become eligible for Special Immigrant Juvenile Status or 
some other form of immigration relief. 
106.  See United Nations Guidelines for the Alternative Care of Children, G.A. Res. 
64/142, U.N. Doc. A/RES/64/142 (Feb. 24, 2010). 
107.  Id. & 11. 
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placement of children for care in a country outside their habitual residence, 
“whether for medical treatment, temporary hosting, respite care or any other 
reason,”108 and guidelines applicable to arrangements for a child needing 
care in a country other than his or her habitual residence.109 The Guidelines 
encourage states to ratify or accede to the Child Protection Convention in 
order to ensure appropriate international cooperation.110 
E. Cross-Border Placement and Cooperation 
Courts and agencies handling international child welfare cases must 
often consider placing children with a parent, relative, or extended family 
member in another country.111  This requires significant cooperation 
between authorities in both countries, typically beginning with a home 
study or other investigation of the proposed custodian.112  This may be 
coordinated through the involvement local consulates, or agencies such as 
International Social Service.113  When there is no parent living in the United 
States, a foreign placement with a relative is often clearly preferable to 
placement for foster care in the United States.114  However, if the child has 
been removed from the custody of a parent living in the United States, a 
foreign placement is likely to make reunification significantly more 
difficult to achieve, and agencies have been appropriately cautious in these 
circumstances.115   
In order to design a permanency plan for a child who has been placed 
abroad, a state court and social services agency will need to consider the 
alternatives available under the law of the country where the child has been 
placed.116  Until the child is a permanently placed for adoption or legal 
guardianship, or transferred to the custody of a parent, the court maintains 
                                                                                                                 
108. Id. & 137.   
109. Id. & 140-152. 
110. Id. & 139. 
111. See In re Sabrina H., 57 Cal. Rptr. 3d 863, 868-69 (Ct. App. 2007).   
112. See, e.g., In re Joshua S., 159 P.3d 49, 51 (Cal. 2007) (describing home study of 
child=s grandmother in Saskatshewan); In re Sabrina H., 57 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 871-73 
(approving home study of grandfather conducted in Mexico by Desarrollo Integral de la 
Familia but holding that criminal background check was also required by statute). 
113. See http://www.iss-usa.org.  
114. See Amity R. Boye, Note, Making Sure Children Find Their Way Home: Obligating 
States Under International Laws to Return Dependent Children to Family Members Abroad, 
69 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1515, 1531-33 (2004). 
115. See, e.g., In re Karla C., 113 Cal. Rptr. 3d 163, 181-82 (Ct. App. 2010); cf. In re 
Sabrina H., 57 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 870.  
116. See, e.g., In re Rosalinda C., 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 58, 59-61 (Ct. App. 1993) (noting that 
Mexican consulate had obtained follow-up home study from the Mexican Social Service 
Agency). 
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its dependency jurisdiction.117  In the case of a child placed abroad, this 
requires further ongoing cooperation between authorities.118  
Can a state court retain jurisdiction over a child welfare case after the 
child is placed in another country?  The court faced this question in In re 
Karla C., after a child was removed from her mother=s custody because the 
mother had failed to protect the child from sexual abuse by the child=s 
stepfather.119  The trial court ordered placement of the child with her father, 
a Peruvian national living in Peru, and retained jurisdiction.120   On appeal, 
the court held that the juvenile court should have considered whether it 
would lose the ability to make or enforce further orders that might be 
necessary or appropriate after placing the child aboard.121  “Should 
problems with the placement arise, or should the court determine that Karla 
should be returned to Mother=s custody, and the juvenile court is unable to 
effect her return to California, Karla=s welfare would be jeopardized.”122 
The jurisdictional problem arose because of the ongoing child protection 
matter, and the court noted that there would be no issue if the court had 
granted legal and physical custody to the father and terminated its 
dependency jurisdiction.123   
Here as well, channels for communication and cooperation between 
authorities in different countries are important. Implementation of the Child 
Protection Convention may facilitate this process, but is not necessary. For 
                                                                                                                 
117.  See id. at 61. 
118.  See, e.g., id. at 60 (noting follow-up home study obtained by Mexican consulate 
from the Mexican Social Service Agency).  Children placed in foster care in other countries 
are not eligible for federally-subsidized foster care payments.  See In re Joshua S., 159 P.3d 
49,58-59 (Cal. 2007). 
119.  See 113 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 165-66. 
120.  See id. at 180.   
121.  See id. at 186. 
122.  Id.  In reaching this conclusion, the court considered a series of earlier decisions in 
international relocation disputes.  See id. at 182-86.  Those cases held that if the non-
relocating parent maintained custody and visitation rights, the courts should take steps to 
insure that its orders would remain enforceable.  See Marriage of Condon v. Cooper, 73 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 33, 35 (Ct. App. 1998); see also Marriage of Abargil, 131 Cal. Rptr .2d 429, 432 
(Ct. App. 2003); In re Marriage of Lasich, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 356, 368-69 (Ct. App. 2002), 
abrogated by In re Marriage of LaMusga, 88 P.3d 81, 95 (Cal. 2004). 
123.  See In re Karla C., 113 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 186.  The current law in the United States 
accords continuing exclusive jurisdiction to the court making the initial determination.  See 
UCCJEA, supra note 9,  ' 202.  This rule conflicts with the approach taken by the Hague 
Child Protection Convention.  Under the Child Protection Convention, jurisdiction to take 
“measures directed to the protection of the child=s person” is assigned to the authorities of 
the child=s state of habitual residence.  See Child Protection Convention, supra note 8, art. 
5(2).  When the child=s habitual residence changes, the authorities of the new habitual 
residence take jurisdiction.  See id. art. 5(2). 
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example, in L.H. v. Youth Welfare Office of Wiesbaden,124 a U.S. court was 
asked to take jurisdiction after German welfare authorities had intervened to 
protect the child of a member of the U.S. armed services stationed in 
Germany. After discussing the matter with the German judge presiding over 
the case, the Family Court in New York refused to modify the German 
orders.   
Placement of a child who resides in another country for alternative care 
in the United States raises significant issues if the child does not already 
hold U.S. citizenship or nationality or permanent resident status.  Placement 
for purposes of adoption must follow the visa requirements of federal 
immigration law, as well as the provisions of the Hague Intercountry 
Adoption Convention if the child is habitually resident in another 
Convention country. If no adoption is contemplated, placement in the 
United States may require obtaining a temporary humanitarian parole to 
allow the child to enter without a visa. 
F. Immigration Relief for Children 
Since 1990, federal immigration law has allowed some minors who are 
present in the United States to petition for lawful permanent resident status 
under the “special immigrant juvenile” rules.125  A child is not eligible 
unless a state court determines, before the child reaches age 21, that 
“reunification with 1 or both immigrant=s parents is not viable due to abuse, 
neglect, abandonment or a similar basis found under State law.”126  For a 
child to be eligible,  a judicial or administrative authority must determine 
“that it would not be in the [child=s] best interest to be returned to the 
[child=s] or parent=s previous country of nationality or the country of last 
habitual residence.”127  In addition, the Department of Homeland Security 
                                                                                                                 
124.  L.H. v. Youth Welfare Office, 568 N.Y.S.2d 852 (Fam. Ct. 1991). 
125. See Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5079 (2008) (codified at 8 U.S.C. ' 
1101(a)(27)(J)(I)); 8 CFR ' 204.11 (2011); see also David Thronson, Kids Will be Kids? 
Reconsidering Conceptions of Children=s Rights Underlying Immigration Law, 63 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 979, 1003-1013 (2002).  Note, however, that any admissions or findings in family court 
proceedings may have collateral immigration consequences for the child’s 
parents.  See  Theo Liebmann, Family Court and the Unique Needs of Children and Families 
Who Lack Immigration Status, 40 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 583, 593-98 (2007). 
126.  Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5079 (2008) (codified at 8 U.S.C. ' 
1101(a)(27)(J)(I)); see 8 CFR ' 204.11 (2011); see also Thronson, supra note 125, at 1003-
1013. 
127.  8 U.S.C. ' 1101(a)(27)(J)(ii) (2006); see, e.g., In re Interest of T.J., 59 So.3d 1187 
(Fla. Ct. App. 2011); In re Interest of Luis G., 764 N.W.2d 648, 654-55 (Neb. Ct. App. 
2009);  In re Emma M., 902 N.Y.S.2d 651, 651 (App. Div. 2010). 
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must give its consent to the grant of special immigrant juvenile status.128  If 
the statutory requirements are met, it does not matter whether the child is 
out of status or entered the country illegally.   
This is a complicated area of immigration law, with many unresolved 
questions, in which the petitioning child=s eligibility depends upon the 
findings made by the state court.129 State agencies and caseworkers should 
be prepared to assist undocumented children in foster care in obtaining 
access to qualified immigration counsel to determine their eligibility.130  
Undocumented immigrant children apprehended by U.S. immigration 
authorities at the border are usually returned immediately to their country of 
origin.  Children detained or apprehended within the United States are 
placed in the custody of the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS), and these children may petition for special immigrant 
juvenile status.131  Responsibility for Unaccompanied Alien Children is 
assigned within HHS to the Division of Unaccompanied Children=s 
Services of the Office of Refugee Resettlement in the Administration for 
Children and Families.132  The Office of Refugee Resettlement is also 
                                                                                                                 
128.  See Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5079 (2008) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. ' 
1101(a)(27)(J)(iii)); see generally SARAH B. IGNATIUS & ELISABETH S. STICKNEY, 
IMMIGRATION LAW AND THE FAMILY '' 14.84-14.87 (2010).  Although relief under the 
statute may be available as long as the petition is filed before the child reaches age 21, 
juvenile court jurisdiction in many states ends when a child reaches age 18.  See id. at ' 
14.84; see, e.g., Trudy-Ann W. v. Joan W., 901 N.Y.S.2d 296, 298 (App. Div. 2010). There 
are other important limitations, for example, Special Immigrant Juvenile status is not 
available for children with criminal convictions. 
129.  The requirements for section 1101 were modified by the William Wilberforce 
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 
5044.  The consent procedures of section 1101 have also been subject of a recent Settlement 
Agreement in class action litigation pending in the Central District of California.  See 
Settlement Agreement, Perez-Olano v. Holder, No. CV 05-3604 (C.D. Cal. May 4, 2010). 
130.  See, e.g., Minnesota Dep=t of Human Servs., Bulletin #10-68-06, Special Immigrant 
Juvenile Status (May 14, 2010), available at http://www.f2f.ca.gov/res/pdf/State_of_Minne 
sota.pdf.  
131.  Consent of HHS is required; see 8 U.S.C. ' 1101(a)(27)(J) (iii) (I).  The current 
HHS procedure is set out in this program instruction: http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ 
orr/whatsnew/Special_Immigrant_Juvenile_StatusInterim_Specific_Consent_Program_Instr
uctions.pdf. According to these instructions, juveniles in HHS custody do not need “specific 
consent” from HHS unless they ask the state juvenile court to determine or alter their 
custody status.  
Earlier cases, holding that federal immigration proceedings preempted state court 
jurisdiction, include In re Zaim R., 822 N.Y.S.2d 368 (Fam. Ct. 2006), and Matter of CMK, 
552 N.W.2d 768 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996).  But see Gao v. Jenifer, 185 F.3d 548 (6th Cir. 
1999).  The preemption principle was the basis for the Florida court=s ruling in the case 
involving Elian Gonzalez.  See infra note 134. 
132.  Unaccompanied Alien Children (UAC) are children who have no lawful 
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responsible for Unaccompanied Refugee Minors, who are children 
identified by the State Department overseas as refugees eligible for 
resettlement in the US, and children who enter as refugees with their 
families and experience family breakdown after arriving in the United 
States.133  Children in both of these programs are generally placed in foster 
care.  
 Children present in the United States may also apply for asylum, either 
affirmatively or in response to the commencement of immigration removal 
proceedings, and generally must file within a year after entering the United 
States.134 A child may also be eligible for a nonimmigrant U visa as a victim 
of criminal activity such as domestic violence or trafficking if the child 
suffered substantial physical  or mental abuse as a crime victim,  and the 
child has information concerning that criminal activity and can be helpful in 
its investigation or prosecution.  Trafficking victims may also be eligible 
for a non-immigrant T visa.  In both of these categories, there is the further 
possibility that the child may obtain derivative visas for qualified family 
members, including parents, children and unmarried siblings under age 
18.135 
II. Using the Hague Child Protection Convention 
In October 2010, the United States signaled its intention to ratify the 
1996 Hague Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, 
Enforcement and Co-operation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and 
Measures for the Protection of Children.136  Among the purposes of the 
                                                                                                                 
immigration status in the United States, who have not reached age 18, and with respect to 
whom there is either no parent or legal guardian in the United States or no parent or legal 
guardian in the United states available to provide care and physical custody.  See generally 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/orr/programs/unaccompanied_alien_children.htm.  In 
Fiscal Year 2009, 6074 children were apprehended and placed into ORR/DUCS care on this 
basis.  On broader issues concerning unaccompanied children, see Thronson, supra note 125, 
at 997-1003; see also Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993). 
133.  See Office of Refugee Resettlement, Unaccompanied Refugee Minors, U.S. DEP=T 
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES (Jan. 31, 2011), 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/orr/programs/unaccompanied_refugee_minors.htm. At the 
present time, there are fewer than 1000 unaccompanied refugee minors in this program. 
134.  One high-profile child welfare case involving a child for whom refugee status was 
claimed was In re Gonzalez, 2000 WL 492101 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2000).  For the federal 
litigation, see Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 2000); see also Sean D. Murphy, 
Return of Elían González to Cuba, 94 Am. J. Int=l. L. 516 (2000). 
135.   See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(15)(U), 1184(p) (U visa); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(15)(T), 
1184(o) (T visa). 
136.  The Child Protection Convention is one of four Children=s Conventions developed 
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Child Protection Convention are “to determine the State whose authorities 
have jurisdiction to take measures directed to the protection of the person or 
property of the child,”137 and “to provide for recognition and enforcement 
of such measures in all Contracting States.”138 In the United States, these 
aspects of the Convention will be accomplished at the state level through 
amendments to the UCCJEA.139  In addition, the Convention establishes a 
process for international cooperation, based on a network of Central 
Authorities in each Contracting State.140    The Convention extends to a 
wide range of subjects, including both public sector child welfare 
proceedings and custody and access issues in private litigation.141   The 
Convention is legally binding between Contracting States,142 and applies to 
children from birth through age 18.143 
A. Jurisdictional Provisions 
Article 5 of the Child Protection Convention allocates primary 
responsibility in matters concerning children to the authorities of the child=s 
                                                                                                                 
by the Hague Conference on Private International Law.  The United States already 
participates in two of these, the Child Abduction Convention and the Intercountry Adoption 
Convention, and has taken steps toward ratification of the Family Maintenance Convention 
and the Child Protection Convention.  See generally Ann Laquer Estin, Families Across 
Borders: The Hague Children=s Conventions and the Case for International Family Law in 
the United States, 62 FLA. L. REV. 47 (2010). 
137.  Child Protection Convention, supra note 8, art. 1 (1)(a); these provisions are in 
Chapter II of the Convention. 
138.  Id., art. 1(1)(d); these provisions are in Chapter IV.  The Convention also addresses 
choice of law issues; see Child Protection Convention, art. 1(1)(b) and (c), and these issues 
are covered in Chapter III. 
139.  See Robert G. Spector, Memorandum: Accommodating the UCCJEA and the 1996 
Hague Convention, 63 OKLA. L. REV. 615 (2011). 
140.  Child Protection Convention, supra note 8, art. 1(e); these provisions are in Chapter 
V. 
141.  Id., art. 3.  The Convention does not apply to parentage determination, adoption, the 
child=s name, emancipation, maintenance obligations, trusts or succession, social security, 
public measures regarding education or health, juvenile offenses, or decisions concerning 
asylum or immigration.  Id., art. 4. 
142.  As of September 2011, the Child Protection Convention has been joined by 33 
Contracting States, including a large number of European nations.  These countries include: 
Albania, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Morocco, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, Ukraine, Uruguay.  Another six nations have signed 
the Convention, including Belgium, Greece, Italy, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the 
United States.  Current information is available on the Hague Conference web site at 
www.hcch.net. 
143.  Child Protection Convention, supra note 8, art. 2.  
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place of habitual residence.144  In Hague Conference practice, habitual 
residence is a straightforward issue of fact, which may be determined 
without resort to legal technicalities that might vary significantly from one 
country to another.145    When a child=s habitual residence changes from one 
Contracting State to another, the authorities in the new habitual residence 
acquire jurisdiction, subject to an exception that applies to cases of 
wrongful removal or retention from the prior habitual residence.146  There is 
an exception to the habitual residence principle that allows authorities 
exercising jurisdiction in divorce, separation, or annulment proceedings 
concerning the child=s parents to take measures concerning the protection of 
the child=s person or property, even if the child is not habitually resident in 
that State.147  This creates a limited category of cases in which authorities in 
two States may have concurrent jurisdiction, and the Convention includes a 
rule requiring authorities to abstain from exercising jurisdiction if, “at the 
time of the commencement of the proceedings, corresponding measures 
have been requested from the authorities of another Contracting State 
having jurisdiction.”148  
Authorities may exercise jurisdiction based on the child=s physical 
presence in a number of specific situations, including cases under Article 6 
involving refugee children, children who are internationally displaced as a 
                                                                                                                 
144.  Id., art. 5(1).  See Paul Lagarde, Explanatory Report, Convention on Jurisdiction, 
Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in Respect of Parental 
Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children, Hague Conference on Private 
International Law, II Actes et documents de la Dix-huitième session 539, && 6, 37 (1996). 
145.  The drafters decided not to include a definition, but agreed that “the temporary 
absence of the child from the place of his or her habitual residence for reasons of vacation, 
for school attendance or the exercise of access rights, for example, did not modify in 
principle the child=s habitual residence.”  See id., & 40.  The Hague Intercountry Adoption 
Convention and the Child Abduction Convention also utilize the habitual residence 
principle.  See Estin, supra note 135, at 53; see also PAUL R. BEAUMONT & PETER E. 
MCELEAVY, THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION 88-90 (1999).    
Although issues of nationality or immigration status should be largely irrelevant to this 
inquiry, there are tensions between the norms of citizenship and habitual residence.  See Ann 
Laquer Estin, Where (in the World) Do Children Belong?, 25 BYU J. PUBLIC L. 217 ( 2011); 
see also Catherine Norris, Immigration and Abduction:  The Relevance of U.S. Immigration 
Status to Defenses Under the Hague Convention on International Child Abduction, 98 CAL. 
L. REV. 159 (2010) (arguing that U.S. courts enforcing the Convention take immigration 
status into account when they should not and fail to weigh immigration status when they 
should). 
146.  Child Protection Convention, supra note 8, art. 5(2) and art. 7.  The Convention=s 
applicable law rules are also based on habitual residence.  See id., arts. 15-22. 
147.  See id., art. 10 (defining requirements).  Note that this jurisdiction ends as soon as 
the divorce or other proceedings are concluded. 
148.  Id., art. 13. 
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result of disturbances in their country, and children whose habitual 
residence cannot be identified.  Additionally, in urgent situations, Article 11 
states that “authorities of any Contracting State in whose territory the child . 
. . is present have jurisdiction to take any necessary measures of 
protection.”149 Similarly, Article 12 allows a Contracting State to enter 
provisional orders to protect the child=s person or property, provided those 
orders must not be incompatible with measures already in place.150  Both of 
these types of jurisdiction are temporary, and lapse once the appropriate 
authorities assert their jurisdiction. 
The Child Protection Convention allows for a transfer of jurisdiction 
from authorities exercising jurisdiction based on habitual residence or 
presence to authorities in another Contracting State that might be “better 
placed in the particular case to assess the best interests of the child.”151  
Under Articles 8 and 9, this transfer could be made to authorities in the 
State of the child=s nationality, a State where the child has property, a State 
where authorities are hearing a divorce, legal separation, or annulment 
action involving the child=s parents, or a State with which the child has a 
substantial connection.152  The transfer process might be requested by the 
authorities on either side, who may communicate with each other either 
directly or with assistance of the Central Authority, and “may proceed to an 
exchange of views.”153   
These jurisdictional provisions are largely consistent with U.S. law, 
except for the approach to continuing jurisdiction in cases in which the 
child obtains a new habitual residence.  In child welfare cases, Articles 6 
and 11 allow authorities to take steps to protect any child present within 
their territory, in terms largely consistent with UCCJEA ' 204.   If a 
transfer of jurisdiction is contemplated, Articles 8 and 9 encourage and 
facilitate communication between authorities regarding such a transfer, and 
Article 14 provides that measures of protection taken in one Contracting 
State remain in force according to their terms until the point when the 
appropriate new authorities modify, replace, or terminate the existing 
orders. 
  
                                                                                                                 
149.  Id., art. 11(1). 
150.  Id., art. 12. 
151.  Id., art. 8(1); see also id., art. 9. 
152.  Id., arts. 8(2) and 9(1). 
153.  Jurisdiction may be transferred if the authorities on both sides accept the request.  
See Lagarde, supra note 143, && 53-60. 
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B. Recognition and Enforcement 
If the United States joins the Child Protection Convention, state and 
federal courts and agencies will be required to recognize and give effect to 
measures taken in other countries within the scope of the Convention as a 
matter of law.154  Recognition may be refused on a limited number of 
grounds, including a conclusion that the measure was taken by an authority 
that did not have a basis for jurisdiction under the Convention.  In addition, 
Contracting States need not recognize measures taken “without the child 
having been provided the opportunity to be heard, in violation of the 
fundamental principles of procedure of the requested State,”155 and may 
decline recognition on the request of a person claiming that the measure 
infringes his or her parental responsibility, if that person was not given an 
opportunity to be heard.156 
Beyond these jurisdictional and procedural grounds, recognition may be 
refused “if such recognition is manifestly contrary to public policy of the 
requested State, taking into account the best interests of the child.”157  
Although this appears to be a traditional ordre public clause, the exception 
is narrowed both by use of  the term “manifestly” and by reference to the 
child=s best interests, suggesting that public policy arguments that are not 
tied directly to the child=s interests are not an appropriate basis for refusing 
recognition.158 
To facilitate cross-border recognition, the Child Protection Convention 
provides that each Contracting State must have a “simple and rapid 
procedure” for declaration of enforceability and registration of measures 
taken in another State,159 without review of the merits.160  “Any interested 
person” may request that the authorities decide whether or not a measure 
taken in another Contracting State will be recognized.161  Once a measure is 
declared to be enforceable or registered for enforcement, it must be 
                                                                                                                 
154.  Child Protection Convention, supra note 8, art. 23(1). 
155.  Id., art. 23(2)(b).  According to Lagarde, supra note 143, & 123, this “does not 
apply in cases of urgency, for which the requirements of procedural due process ought to be 
interpreted more flexibly.”  
156.  Child Protection Convention, supra note 8, art. 23(2)(c).  There is an exception here 
as well for emergency circumstances. 
157.   Id., art. 23(2)(d). 
158.  See Lagarde, supra note 143, & 125 (noting that this is the same language used in 
Article 24 of the Intercountry Adoption Convention, which is discussed at some length in the 
Explanatory Report for that Convention). 
159.  Child Protection Convention, supra note 8, art. 26(2). 
160.  Id., art. 27. 
161.  Id., art. 24. 
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enforced in accordance with the law of the requested State, taking into 
consideration the child=s best interests.162 
Although a wide range of foreign country child custody and visitation 
orders are already subject to recognition under the UCCJEA, the Child 
Protection Convention will provide a basis to secure reciprocal recognition 
in other Contracting States of orders entered in the United States.  This has 
been the central rationale for ratification of the Convention, and it offers 
obvious benefits for private litigation involving matters such as custody, 
relocation, and access rights.163  The recognition principle should also assist 
authorities in public child welfare proceedings working with transnational 
families, although in these cases the cooperation provision of the 
Convention are also important. 
C. International Cooperation 
Under the Child Protection Convention, each Contracting State must 
designate a Central Authority with responsibilities for promoting 
cooperation to achieve the purposes of the Convention.164   Central 
Authorities have specific duties, including providing information regarding 
the laws and services available for the protection of children,165 facilitating 
communications between courts or other authorities,166 and providing 
assistance in discovering the whereabouts of a child who may be present 
and in need of protection in the requested State.167   A Central Authority 
may be asked to provide a report on the situation of a child who is 
habitually resident in a Contracting State, or to request that the appropriate 
authorities take action to protect the child.168  Central Authorities are also 
charged with facilitating “by mediation, conciliation or similar means, 
                                                                                                                 
162.  Id., art. 28.  Lagarde, supra note 143, & 135, uses the example of a child placed 
with his family under the supervision of social authorities.  If the child and his family 
relocate to another Contracting State, enforcement may require that local authorities in the 
new State are authorized to carry out the supervision. 
163.  See, e.g., Linda J. Silberman, The 1996 Hague Convention on the Protection of 
Children: Should the United States Join?, 34 FAM. L.Q. 239 (2000). 
164.  Child Protection Convention, supra note 8, arts. 29 and 30(1). 
165.  Id., art. 30(2). 
166.  Id., art. 31(a). 
167.  Id., art. 31(c).  Note the confidentiality principle in Art. 37:  authorities “shall not 
request or transmit any information under this chapter if to so would, in its opinion, be likely 
to place the child=s person or property in danger, or constitute a serious threat to the liberty 
or life of a member of the child=s family.” 
168.  Id., art. 32.  This may be done “[o]n a request made with supporting reasons” by the 
authorities “of any Contracting State with which the child has a substantial connection.” 
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agreed solutions for the protection of the person or property of the child in 
situations to which the Convention applies.”169  
The Child Protection Convention anticipates the need for communication 
between the courts and agencies of different Contracting States, which may 
be channeled through the Central Authorities.  For example, a court in one 
country considering measures of protection for a child might request that 
authorities in another Contracting State communicate information that 
would be relevant to the proceeding.170  A court in one Contracting State 
may request that authorities in another assist in implementing measures of 
protection, or in securing effective exercise of access rights.171 
Cooperation between Central Authorities is obligatory in the case of a 
transborder placement of a child for some type of alternative care. The 
authorities of a Contracting State proposing to place a child abroad must 
consult with authorities in the other State, and transmit to them a report on 
the child with the reasons for the proposed placement.  The placement may 
be made only if authorities in the requested State consent to the placement 
or provision of care.172  Cooperation is also obligatory in any case in which 
a child is exposed to a serious danger, and the child’s residence is changed 
to another country. If authorities in a State which has taken measures to 
protect the child are informed that child=s residence has been changed or 
that the child is present in another country, they must inform authorities 
there about the situation.173   
These provisions for international cooperation fall largely beyond the 
scope of the UCCJEA and the uniform laws project, and effective 
implementation will require a strong role for the U.S. Central Authority, 
which is likely to be the Office of Children=s Issues (OCI) located in the 
Bureau of Consular Affairs in the State Department.  In developing this 
system, OCI can build on its experience under the Hague Abduction 
Convention and the Hague Adoption Convention, and on the broader 
experience of the State Department handling traditional consular functions 
related to child protection. As a federal nation, the United States could 
implement a system in which each state designates its own Central 
                                                                                                                 
169.  Id., art. 31(b).  A number of these duties can be delegated to other bodies.  See 
Lagarde, supra note 143, & 140. 
170.  Child Protection Convention, supra note 8, art. 34(1).  Providing such information 
is not obligatory.  See Lagarde, supra note 143, & 144. 
171.  Child Protection Convention, supra note 8, art. 35(1). 
172.  Id., art. 33. 
173.  Id., art. 36.  Lagarde, supra note 143, & 150, cites these examples of serious danger: 
“an illness requiring constant treatment, drugs, unhealthy influence of a sect.” This 
obligation applies even when the other country involved is not a Contracting State. 
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Authority, but the Convention requires that a single Central Authority be 
designated to receive and transmit communications under the conventions.  
D. Implementing the Child Protection Convention 
Global child welfare cases present unique challenges, even in 
comparison to the subjects of the other Hague Children=s Conventions.  
Although all state child welfare systems in the United States include a 
series of components required by federal law, there is significant variation 
among the states in the design of these systems, and no uniform state law 
comparable to the UCCJEA that is available as a basis for harmonizing the 
differences at a national level.  Even in purely domestic cases, achieving 
cooperation between child welfare authorities in different states has been 
extremely difficult.136   
A strong Central Authority providing assistance to the states in 
international child welfare cases could be enormously helpful to state courts 
and agencies struggling to do justice in exceptionally difficult 
circumstances.  This would not have to wait until ratification of the Child 
Protection Convention is accomplished.  The Convention offers a useful 
structure for cooperation, but many of its purposes could be accomplished 
within the broad scope of the State Department’s consular authority. 
The Office of Children=s Issues already maintains excellent web sites 
collecting information and resources on child abduction and intercountry 
adoption, but there is very little addressing global child welfare issues.  
Development of this information, and a clearinghouse on state child 
protection laws that would satisfy Article 30(2), could precede ratification.    
Similarly, the appointment of several U.S. judges to the Hague Judicial 
Network has helped to build channels for international judicial cooperation 
even without explicit treaty language on point.  Judges with expertise in 
child welfare cases could be added to the network.  When the United States 
is ready to ratify, these already-established channels would help satisfy the 
requirements of Article 31(a). 
Other Central Authority responsibilities under the Child Protection 
Convention build readily on traditional consular functions and 
relationships.  Foreign countries already make requests for information on 
the whereabouts and welfare of children or parents or extended family 
                                                                                                                 
136. See generally Vivek Sankaran, Perpetuating the Impermanence of Foster Children: 
A Critical Analysis of Efforts to Reform the Interstate Compact on the Placement of 
Children, 40 FAM. L.Q. 435 (2006); Robert G. Spector & Cara N. Rodriguez, Jurisdiction 
Over Children in Interstate Placement: The UCCJEA, Not the ICPC, Is the Answer, 41 FAM. 
L.Q. 145 (2007). 
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members within the United States, and state authorities already request this 
kind of information from their counterparts in other countries. States would 
benefit from assistance in carrying out their consular notice obligations 
under the Vienna Convention, and a framework for assuring that this notice 
occurs would help to prevent difficult foreign relations situations.  At 
present, it appears that these matters are handled on a largely ad hoc basis, 
which could be made more efficient and reliable. Development of channels 
for these communications would put the United States in position to 
implement Articles 31(c) and 32 of the Protection Convention. 
Conclusion 
All children and parents have rights and relationships worthy of 
comparable respect, but our child welfare agencies and courts do not have 
the tools they need to protect children’s interests in global cases of abuse, 
neglect, exploitation, abandonment, or parent loss.  Lawyers, judges and 
caseworkers may lack the training and experience to make the best use of 
those tools that are available to provide assistance.  The chronic shortage of 
resources for child protection is particularly acute in this setting, especially 
for undocumented immigrant children or families. The problems have been 
aggravated by our federalist system, in which states have bottom-line 
responsibility for child welfare, but the federal government sets policies in 
immigration and international relations.   
The Hague Child Protection Convention will not solve these difficult 
problems, but implementation of the Convention, with a strong Central 
Authority at the national level, could offer important assistance for states.  
This role is consistent with the consular functions of the State Department, 
and the work of the Office of Children’s Issues in intercountry adoption and 
international child abduction cases.  Implementation should also build on 
the federal government’s longstanding role in funding and setting the 
framework for state child welfare systems under the Social Security Act. 
Before the Convention can be implemented, and beyond what it can 
contribute, state courts and agencies will continue to bear the ultimate 
responsibility to address the needs of children in transnational child welfare 
cases.   
 
 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol63/iss4/5
